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LUZON SURETY vs QUEBRAR                       Full reading click here

G.R. No. L-40517 January 31, 1984

 

By: Vinzin M. Savando

 

Facts: Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in behalf of defendant “Quebrar being the administrator in a special proceeding entitled " Re Testate Estate of A. B. Chinsuy," and Re Testate Estate of Cresenciana Lipa,". In consideration of such suretyship Luzon Surety Company, Inc. was bound jointly and severally with the defendant. Defendant on the other hand executied an indemnity agreement that they Pastor T. Quebrar and Francisco Kilayko be jointly and severaly bound to pay the plaintiff-appellee "the sum of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) in advance as premium thereof for every 12 months or fraction thereof. Defendants paid only one year 1954-1955. 

 

The SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

June 6, 1957, the CFI of Negros Occidental approved the amended Project of Partition and Accounts of defendant. 

 

May 8, 1962, the plaintiff demanded the defendants to pay the premiums and documentary stamps from August 9, 1955 onwards. 

 

October 17, 1962, the defendants-appellants ordered a motion for cancellation and/or reduction of executor's bonds on the ground that "the heirs of the testate estates have already received their respective shares" and said motion was granted by CFI of Negros Occidental and ordered the bond cancelled on October 20, 1962.

 

Hence plaintiff filed a case with the CFI of Manila for the recovery of unpaid premium from defendant for the period of August 9, 1955 to October 20, 1962 amounted to P 2,436.00 in each case, hence, a total of P4,872.00.  It was granted by CFI of Manila. On the ground that bonds were in force and in effect from the filing until 1962. On Defendants appeal, CA certified the case to the SC after finding that the case involves only errors or questions of law.

 

Issue: Are the bonds still in force and effect from 1955 to 1962?

 

Held. YES. For the following reasons:

1. Bond is required under rule 81 (Sec. 1) of the Rules of Court.

2. The surety’s liability under the bond is co-extensive with that of the administrator.

3. Administrator’s obligation did not ceased until the bond was ordered cancel by the Court on October 20 1962.

4. There was no bond stipulation that it will terminate at the end of the 1st year if the premium remains unpaid. In effect the bond will be held liable as long as the defendant remains the administrator of the estate, therefore the plaintiff's liabilities as the surety subsist until 1962 being co-extensive with the administrator.

 

Notes:

Question

Is the administrator's bond ceased its legal force and effect upon approval of the project of partition and statement of accounts on June 6, 1957. ?

 

Answer

NO.  Why?  Because administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.  And liquidation means the determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses.  It appears that there were still debts and expenses to be paid after June 6, 1957.

 

What is "principle of strictissimi juris"  -  it means the strictest right or law; is to be interpreted in the strictest manner.

 

 

 

 

ISABEL V. SAGUINSIN vs. DIONISIO LINDAYAG

G.R. No. L-17759          December 17, 1962

 

 

complete reading click here

 

by: James Villalon

 

FACTS:

On November 10, 1959 Maria V. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo, Zambales. On May 27, 1960 her sister, Isabel V. Saguinsin filed with the Court of First Instance of said province a verified petition for the issuance in her favor of letters of administration over the estate of said deceased, alleging, among other things, that the latter left real and personal properties situated in the Provinces of Zambales and Bulacan worth approximately P100,000.00; that the names, ages and residences of her surviving heirs.

On June 21, 1960 Dionisio V. Lindayag, the surviving spouse, in his behalf and in representation of the minors filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground lack of interest in the estate, she being neither heir nor a creditor thereof. The motion alleged that the late Maria V. Lindayag was survived by her husband — the movant — and their legally adopted minor children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag the decedent having left no legitimate natural or illegitimate child.

 

 

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is "an interested person" in the estate of deceased Maria V. Lindayag?

 

RULE:

Petitioner's interest in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was disputed, through a motion to dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse on the ground that said deceased was survived by him and by three legally adopted children — thus excluding petitioner as an heir. In the course of the hearing held in connection with said motion, evidence was introduced in support thereof which, according to the lower court, established that said deceased was survived not only by her husband but by three legally adopted children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag.

Upon these facts — which petitioner does not dispute — it is manifest that she is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate.

 

 

 

OZAETA VS. PECSON                             complete reading
by: May Florence Manaog

 

FACTS:
Carlos Palanca died leaving a will, he appointed petitioner Ozaeta, a former associate justice of SC, aclose friend of his wife and sponsor to their marriage, as his executor should Gen. Roxas fails to qualifySince Gen. Roxas already died, Ozaeta petitioned the court for the probate of the will of Carlos and pray he be appointed as special administrator. The will was allowed, but some of the heirs opposed. Thus pending appeal, the court appointed in Phil. Trust Bank as special administrator but later on it withdrew on ground of incompatibility of interest.Petitioner Ozaeta reiterate his appointment as special administrator but the court refused and instead appoint 1 of the heirs and the BPI. Petitioner then filed the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it appointed special administratorother than the name executor, while pending appeal.

HELD: Court ruled in favor of Ozaeta and held that, while the rule grant discretion to the probate court to appoint or not a special administrator and the choice of person lies within its power, such discretion should not be whimsical and partial but one that is reasonable, logical and in accordance with the fundamental legal principle of justice. A probate court cannot make a personal likes and dislikes prevail over his judgment.
Since the choice of executor is a precious prerogative of testator according to his desire toappoint one of his confidant whom he can trust to carry out his wishes, the appointment and issuance of letters must be made as soon as practicable.
In the case at bar, since the will has already been admitted to probate and the only reason for
suspending petitioner’s appointment as executor and instead appoint special administrator is a
technical one, unreasonable and would further delay the disposition causing unnecessary expense.

 

 

ROXAS VS. PECSON                                     complete reading

by: May Florence Manaog

FACTS:

Pablo Roxas died. His sister, Maria and brother, Pedro, respondents herein filed a petition for intestate proceeding and be appointed as administrator. Later on, the petition was dismissed. As petitioner Natividad Roxas, the surving spouse, filed a petition for probate of the last will where she was named as executrix. Half of the property was bequethed to Natividad and the other half to Pablo's adulterous child. The will was denied probate technically for lack of signatures. Petitioner-spouse appealed and pray she be appointed as special administrator. And so, Maria and Pedro petitioned the court to be appointed as special administrators.The judge ordered the appointment of Natividad as special administartor but only for the conjugal property of the deceased and appoint at the same time Maria to administer the exclusive property of the deceased. Hence this petition by the surviving spouse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge committed grave abuse of discretion in appointing 2 separate special adminstrator of the decedent.

HELD:
SC held in the affirmative. The judge erred in appointing 2 independent special administrators.

It finds no reason to do so especially if the estate to be settled is that of the deceased husband. Since marriage is dissolved upon death of the husband or wife, it follows then that the community property shall be inventoried, administered and liquidated, and the person to do this shall also be the one to administer, distribute and liquidate the exclusive property of the deceased spouses.

The widow, who still has a beneficial interest even after the will was diapproved since pending appeal, has the right of usufruct over the ½ of the exclusive property of decedent besides her share in the conjugal partnership. And has more interest in the entire estate. The beneficial interest required as qualification for appointment of administrator is the interest in the whole estate and not only in some part thereof.

Lastly, Since under the law, only one general administrator may be appointed toadminister, liquidate and distribute estate of the deceased, it follows then that only 1special administrator may be appointed in lieu of the former until questions causing delay are decided.

 

 

 

ADVINCULA VS TEODORO

by: Almujer Ammang

 

FACTS:

• EMILIO ADVINCULA was appointed special administrator, later on, a regular administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, Josefa Lacson Advincula;

• HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE TEODORO, SR. was the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental where the case was heard;

• After being qualified as an administrator, his brothers-in-law submitted a document purporting to be his deceased wife’s will;

• Advincula opposed to the probation of said will contending that the signature is either fake or fraudulently secured;

• Enrique Lacson, one of the brothers-in-law,  prayed to be appointed as administrator to take Advincula’s place. This was granted taking into consideration Emilio’s alleged incompetency, incapability and unsuitability to act as administrator due to his apparent unfamiliarity with the estate;

• Advincula filed for an MR but was denied. He thus filed for certiorari to annul the lower court’s order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in granting Lacson’s petition

 

RULING:

• Under Section 2 of Rule 73, “When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.” As the deceased’s husband, Advincula is a forced heir as “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership”.

• Under Section 3 of Rule 73, “In the exercise of probate jurisdiction, Courts of First Instance may issue warrants and process necessary to…carry into effect theirs orders and judgments, and all other powers granted them by law.” As Advincula was Petitioner was, on November 22, 1954, appointed, special administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, Josefa Lacson Advincula, in special proceeding No. 3245 of said court. And in due course, he was, on February 12, 1955, appointed regular administrator of said estate”, Advincula could not be removed as an administrator after having been legally qualified and appointed as such when the purported will is not yet probate and when he has not committed any of the following acts as mentioned in section 2 of Rule 83 which provides for the grounds for the lawful removal of an administrator/executor.

• The “mere discovery of a document purporting to be the last will of a deceased person does not, ipso facto, nullify the issued letters of administration until said ‘will’is probated”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CRISOSTOMO VS ENDENCIA   G.R 45623

By: Vinzin Savando

 

Appointed Guardian: Jesus Crisostomo

Respondent: CFI Judge and Ramon Crisostomo

CFI of Bulacan

 

FACTS:  The incapacitated heir Petrona Crisostomo has been released from the National Psychopathic Hospital.  From there a verified petition accompanied with two medical certificates stating that she has already recovered her mental faculties was filed by her guardian for the restoration of her capacity before same Court having cognizance of the latter’s Guardianship proceeding. GRANTED.

 

After 9 months lapse from the issuance of the order came Ramon Crisostomo brother of the incompetent filed a petition that the restoration order be set aside, the case be reopened, and that a new guardian of the person and property of Petrona Crisostomo be appointed, alleging that the order of restoration is Null and Void because it was entered without notice to the nearest relatives and without hearing and that the latter had not yet recovered her mentality. Judge ordered that restoration of capacity of Petrona be anulled.  A motion was denied hence petitioner elevated through writ of certiorari to CA still denied.

 

ISSUE:W/N the restoration of the wards capacity is NULL and VOID.

 

HELD:  NO. Restoration is valid, 1st. because the action taken after the elapse of time within which any interested party may appeal cannot be entertained anymore because the Court has no more Jurisdiction over Guardianship Proceeding.  When the respondent Ramon Crisostomo filed his motion asking the annulment of the order of February 29, 1936, the latter had already become final and binding upon the parties. The guardianship case was no longer before the court because the accounts of the guardian had been definitely approved, his bond had been cancelled, he had been relieved of his charge, and the incompetent had recovered her capacity before the law.

2nd. The order of restoration of incompetent capacity was appealable and the petitioner could have perfected an appeal therefrom if he so desired. It is fact, however, that the petitioner did not appeal from the order and the appeal does not now lie because the period therefor provided by law has long expired.

 

In order that a court taking cognizance of the guardianship of an incompetent may issue a valid order restoring him to capacity it is necessary, under this section, (1) that a verified petition be presented by the incompetent, his guardian, or any relative of such person within the third degree, or any friend of his; (2) that said petition should allege that the incompetent has recovered his mental faculties or his legal capacity, as the case may be; and (3) that upon receiving the petition the court should set the same for hearing and notify the guardian and the incompetent thereof. At the hearing, the guardian, the relatives of the incompetent, and, in the discretion of the court, any other person may oppose the remedy sought. The section does not require notice of the hearing to any other person except the guardian and the incompetent. In the case under study it happened that the verified petition was signed by the guardian himself and was supported and accompanied by the sworn statement of the incompetent. In the petition it was stated that the incompetent had recovered her mental faculties and this allegation was corroborated by her in her sworn statement when she stated that she had already recovered her mental faculties. In these circumstances the only logical conclusion is that the requisites of section 562 have at least been substantially complied with and that the notice and the hearing were unnecessary and superfluous.

 

 

 

 

JAUCIAN vs. QUEROL     G.R. No. L-11307            

October 5, 1918

 

By: James Villalon

 

 

FACTS:

In October, 1908, Lino Dayandante and Hermenegilda Rogero executed aprivate writing in which they acknowledged themselves to be indebted to Roman Jaucian in the sum of P13,332.33.The writing indicates that they “jointly and severally acknowledge” their indebtedness with an interest of 10 % per annum.

Rogero signed this document in the capacity of surety for Dayandante however as clearly seen is the document the former bound himself solidarily and nothing in the terms show that he did only as surety. Rogero filed a action against Jaucian claiming her signature was procured by fraud, while Jaucian asked for the payment of the claim which had matured.

The Trial Court ruled for Rogero, Jaucian appealed and during the pendency of such appeal Rogero died and was substituted by her administrator Querol, the SC reversed the judgment of the trial court and ruled that Jaucian’s claim was valid. However, during the pendency of the above appeal after Querol was made administrator and the committee on claims made its first report on Sept 3, 1912. Only one and a half years after said report was given, did Jaucian enter an appearance in the estate proceedings petitioning for execution of the private document plus 10% interest (claiming that Dayandante principal debtor was insolvent)

Querol opposed claiming that more than 18 months had past from the filing of the report of the committee and the court was w/o jurisdiction to entertain the demand of Jaucian.  After hearing, the court suggested or stated that Jaucian’s claim was merely contingent and he should have first filed an action against Dayandante to prove the principal debtors insolvency, so that the supposed surety estate of Rogero would have basis for subrogation. Jaucian followed such suggestion, and after obtaining judgment against Dayandante refilled a petition contending that the order of the court “admitted the claim.”

 

 

ISSUE:

            Whether or not non presentation of contingent claims barred the obligation of the debtor?

 

RULE:

            The court held in affirmative. Jaucian claims that the deceased was merely a surety, and his claim was contingent. According to the code of civil procedure such claims “"may be presented with the proof to the committee," and it follows that such presentation is optional. He further contends that if a creditor holding a contingent claim does not see fit to avail himself of the privilege thus provided, there is nothing in the law which says that his claim is barred or prescribed, and that such creditor, under section 748 of the Code of Civil Procedure, at any time within two years from the time allowed other creditors to present their claims, may, if his claim becomes absolute within that period present it to the court for allowance.

 

However, the court gave more credence to the contention of Querol that contingent claims like absolute claims are barred for non-presentation to the committee and that the claim in question was in reality an absolute claim and therefore indisputably barred. The deceased bound herself solidarily with the debtor, and thus it is clear that she was, after her death absolutely liable. If the claim had been duly presented to the committee for allowance by petitioner then it would have been allowed. This not being the case, Jaucian’s petition must fail.